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Voting Trusts in the Airline Industry
Over the past several years the voting trust has been frequently used
in the airline industry. The airline companies have used it in attempts
to divest themselves of control of other air carriers hoping to avoid the dual
control prohibitions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The Civil
Aeronautics Board [hereinafter CAB] has been required to determine
whether a controlling block of stock, placed in a voting trust, vests control
in the voting trustees or leaves it in the beneficial owners of the stock.
In rather similar situations, the CAB has reached contrary results, which
will be examined here against a background of voting trusts in other areas.
I. BACKGROUND
A. In General
The use of the voting trust was attempted as early as the 1800s. It
was initially viewed by the courts as being against public policy and in
many instances in violation of statutes which prohibited such devices. In
early decisions it appeared to the courts to be contrary to public policy
that a person-having no beneficial interest in stock-was allowed to
vote the stock.' A New Jersey court in Cone v. Russell stated: "[W]here
a person who has little or no actual ownership has the unrestricted voting
power of a majority of the stock . .. the underlying and fundamental
understanding . ..upon which the association [corporation] is founded
is abandoned and broken."' The skeptical view of the courts toward the
voting trust was emphasized by Justice Pitney in the famous case of
Warren v. Pim where he stated "[The voting trustee] is only a sham
owner vested with a colorable and fictitious title for the sole purpose of
voting upon stock that he does not own. '
The prevailing view today is that voting trusts are not illegal per se4
'Bostwick v. Chapman, 60 Conn. 553, 24 At. 32 (Super. Ct. 1890); State ex rel Schwartz
v. O.&M. R.R., 6 Ohio C.C.R. 415 (Cir. Ct. 1892).2 Cone's Ex'rs v. Russell, 48 N.J. Eq. 208, 21 Atl. 847, 849 (Ch. 1891).
366 N.J. Eq. 353, 59 Atl. 773, 785 (Ct. Err. & App. 1904). This adverse view of the voting
trust was further emphasized at p. 788 where Justice Pitney stated:
[I]n truth and in essence, and for all purposes of a court of equity, a voting trust
that has for its sole object the permanent separation of the voting power from the
substantial ownership of the shares is not a putting of the shares in trust. It is a
putting of false evidence of share ownership into the hands of the trustee, for the
purpose of enabling the trustee to represent himself as a shareholder at the stock-
holders' meetings, and thereupon be admitted to the election.
"Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc., 25 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1928); Moses v. Scott, 8A Ala. 608,
4 So. 742 (1888); Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55 N.E. 809 (1900).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
and most corporate statutes now expressly permit them.' Many cases have
held that a voting trust is a trust in the accepted equitable sense and is
subject to the principles of trust administration. Under the usual voting
trust agreement trustees vote the stock in trust in the same manner as
the owners and not as mere agents, although many variations such as
non-binding consultation with the beneficiaries or binding instructions
from all or a prescribed majority of the beneficiaries are possible. The
voting trust places shareholder control in a limited number of persons
who can control the corporation's activities by electing directors.' The
trustees exercise the usual voting rights of the entrusted shares and, if
the agreement provides, they may vote with respect to extraordinary cor-
porate matters such as merger and consolidation. Generally, voting trusts
are valid today, even in the absence of statute, unless an improper purpose
or motive is found.'
B. In Airlines
The voting trust is generally used in business by a small number of
persons to acquire control or to preserve control against dissipation by
sales, gifts or bequests. In contrast, the voting trust has historically been
used in the airline industry by a single shareholder attempting to divest
himself or itself of control of a corporation. In both situations the main,
object of the voting trust is control, but it is approached from completely
different view points. Most airline cases involving the voting trust con-
cern the issue of control and the problem of the CAB's jurisdiction. Both
of these problems arise under Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act,'
which prohibits simultaneous control of two air carriers, except with CAB
approval.
1. Divestiture Cases
The CAB in the Indiana-Ohio Local Service Case"° approved the use
of a voting trust under certain specified conditions.1' The agreement was
'See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code Ann. Pt. 5, ch. I, § 2230 (Deering 1962); Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 31,
Art. 4, § 17 (1963); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 218 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 608, S 608.44
(1956); Ga. Code Ann. tit. 22, § 1863.1 (Supp. 1963); Minn. Stat. Ann. ch. 300, S 301.27
(1947); N.Y. Stock Corp. Law, § 50 (McKinney 1951).
6Brown v. McLanahan, 148 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1949); A.F. Adams v. Clearance Corp., 35
Del. Ch. 318, 116 A.2d 893 (Ch. 1955), aff'd, 35 Del. Ch. 459, 121 A.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Jesser v. Mayfair Hotel, Inc., 316 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. 1958).
See generally Ballentine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation, 21 Texas L. Rev. 139
(1942-1943); 1 Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations 107 (5th ed, 1953).
'Dewing lists the four chief purposes of the voting trust as: (1) to carry out a judicial decree
of the provisions of a statute requiring some measure of quasi-public operation of a private cor-
poration; (2) to prevent passing of control into unfriendly hands; (3) to insure an embarrassed
or reorganized corporation of permanently responsible management that will protect and conserve
the interests of all; and (4) as part of the procedure of promoting a new corporation, to enable
the promoters and bankers to dispose of a considerable portion of the voting stock and yet retain
control.
972 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1958). Discussed infra Section II.
016 C.A.B. 880 (1953).
"Indiana-Ohio Local Service Case, 16 C.A.B. 880 (1953) at 889. The conditions imposed by
the Board were as follows:
(1) The prior approval of the Board should be obtained before the appointment or changes of
trustees or directors, and before any modification, amendment, addition, termination, or cancellation
of the voting trust agreement may become effective.
[Vol. 31
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approved for an interim period pending completion of an agreement for
permanent divestiture of control of Lake Central Airlines by Roscoe P.
Weesner and William W. Weesner. Section 401 of the Federal Aviation
Act'" requires a finding by the CAB that a carrier is fit, willing and able
to perform air services and to comply with the provisions of the act before
certification can be given. Divestiture was necessary in the Indiana-Ohio
case because Lake Central's management and controlling shareholders had
violated various provisions of the act, and according to the CAB the
violations exhibited Lake Central's unwillingness and inability to comply
with section 401. The Board pointed out that its approval of the voting
trust did not "constitute a determination that the Weesners no longer
have 'control' of Lake Central"'" within the meaning of Section 408 of
the Federal Aviation Act.'4 The Board further emphasized that, if the
question of control were before it in the case, it would be compelled to
hold that the powers remaining in the beneficial owners under the voting
trust vested at least negative control in their hands."5
Another voting trust was apparently approved in the Arthur Vining
Davis, Control Relationships Proceeding. Davis sought approval of a
control relationship between himself, Mackey Airlines and others pursuant
to section 408 of the act. The initial decision of the examiner showed
Davis as the owner of 418,000 shares of Mackey out of 1,500,000 shares
outstanding. Davis had executed a trust agreement placing all his shares
of Mackey stock under a trustee's control. The examiner pointed out that
the trust was irrevocable under Florida law for ten years unless modified
and that modification was subject to approval by the CAB. The examiner
found that Davis did not control Mackey Airlines, thereby granting im-
plied approval of the voting trust utilized by Davis.
The Hughes-TWA-Atlas-Northeast Airlines Possible Common Con-
trol Case" was initiated because of allegations in the pleadings of the
(2) The prior approval of the Board should be obtained before Lake Central may engage in any
transaction which the Weesners have any substantial interest, directly or indirectly.
(3) During the life of the voting trust agreement previously referred to, certified copies of
minutes of all meetings of Lake Central's board of directors and all meetings of the holders of
trustee certificates should be filed with the Board.
(4) While serving as a director for Lake Central, or as attorney for the carrier, William H.
Kreig should not otherwise act as attorney for the Weesners.
(5) The Board shall retain jurisdiction over this agreement for the purpose of renewing at any
time approvals granted herein or imposing at any time, with or without hearing, such other con-
ditions as it may find to be just and reasonable.
"s72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. § 1300 (1958).
l" Indiana-Ohio Local Service Case, supra note 11 at 889.
"4The control provisions of § 408 originally appeared in the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, 52 Star. 1001 (now Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [hereinafter called the act], 72 Stat. 767,
49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1958)).
"The trust was revocable by (1) the expiration of 10 years; (2) sale of 75% of the Lake
Central stock; (3) termination of the carriers certificate of public convenience and necessity;
(4) approval by the Board of the revesting of control in the Weesners; or (5) adjudication of
bankruptcy or appointment of a receiver of Lake Central. This power of revocation was con-
strued as negative control by the Board.
"623 C.A.B. 130 (1956).
"The CAB did not review the examiner's decision because no exceptions were filed. It is argu-
able, due to the fact that Colonel Mackey owned the majority of the shares of Mackey Airlines
and managed the Company, that Davis, despite his 418,000 shares, did not control the Company
and the voting trust was of no consequence to the decision.
"27 C.A.B. 155 (1958).
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New York-Florida Case'" indicating that Howard Hughes had acquired
approximately eleven per cent of the outstanding shares of the Atlas
Corporation's common stock. Since, in earlier proceedings, Hughes had
been found to control TWA"0 and Atlas to control Northeast,' control of
Atlas by Hughes would have constituted control of two air carriers with-
out prior approval of the Board as required by statute. The CAB had
rejected Hughes' plan for insulation from control of Atlas by use of a
complex voting trust.2 Hughes filed a petition for reconsideration of the
order and expressly submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Board,
offering to place all his Atlas stock with a neutral bank or trust company
under any form of trust agreement that the Board might propose. The
CAB proposed a voting trust agreement" describing it as relatively simple,
of short duration (three years) and as immobilizing any control which
Hughes might have.
The essential elements of the Board's recommended voting trust agree-
ment were:
24
(1) The voting trust shall be irrevocable and may not be terminated
or modified in any manner without approval by the CAB, except by
sale or divestiture of the beneficial ownership by Hughes.
(2) The stock shall be voted by the trustees in accordance with the
recommendations of the Atlas management.
(3) Prior to termination of the voting trust, Hughes shall divest
himself of all interest in the stock unless the Board authorizes otherwise.
(4) Hughes is authorized to exercise pre-emptive rights to future
Atlas stock offerings and such acquisitions shall become subject to the
trust.
(5) The trustee shall issue voting trust certificates entitling the bene-
ficial owner to dividends.
This form of trust apparently will be approved by the CAB as an insula-
tion from control, but only after the Board has acquired jurisdiction for
the purpose of section 408 of the act."
One of the most recent and highly publicized uses of the voting trust
is the Hughes Tool Company-TWA financing arrangement. " During
1960, in order to finance the cost of jet aircraft needed by TWA, Hughes
Tool Company [hereinafter Toolco] was forced by the lending institu-
tions to place its seventy-eight per cent stock interest in TWA in a voting
"24 C.A.B. 94 (1956).
'0 Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Control by Hughes Tool Company, 6 C.A.B. 153
(1944); TWA-Further Control by Hughes Tool Company, 12 C.A.B. 192 (1950).
" Atlas Corp., Control by Consolidated Vultee, 9 C.A.B. 921 (1948).
"CAB Order No. E-12457.
" Hughes-TWA-Atlas-Northeast Airlines Possible Common Control Case, 27 C.A.B. 155 (1 958)
at 157.
" See detailed discussion infra, section III-A.
'" See Seaboard & Western Airlines, Agreements, 32 C.A.B. 1322, 1325 (1960). In this proceeding
the CAB alluded to the form of trust agreement proposed in the Hughes-Atlas case and again set
out the elements of a voting trust agreement which it apparently considers adequate to insulate an
airline from voting control by another airline.
"°Trans World Air., Control by Hughes, 32 C.A.B. 1363 (1960).
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trust. These lending institutions provided 165 million dollars in exchange
for TWA's notes and the power to control the airline's day-to-day opera-
tions. The CAB stated that the most significant features of the financing
plan were the voting trust agreement, the option agreement and the note
holders agreement which together assured that TWA's management would
not be influenced by Toolco. The Board found that the plan of financing,
including the voting trust agreement, was not inconsistent with the
public interest." It is interesting to compare this trust with those generally
used in the business community. The Toolco-TWA trust, though imposed
by the lending institutions for business purposes, is similar to other voting
trusts used in the airline industry in that its primary purpose is to divest
Toolco of control of TWA.
2. Jurisdiction Cases
In other recent cases involving the voting trust device, the issue has
been whether the trust was used to circumvent the Board's jurisdiction
under section 408." Parties executing voting trust agreements have argued
that their agreements comply with the CAB's proposed trust agreement as
promulgated in The Hughes-TWA-Atlas-Northeast Airlines Possible Com-
mon Control Case."' The Pan American-National Airlines investigation 0
illustrates that this argument has been ineffective when the Board finds
that the trust was used to circumvent its jurisdiction under section 408.
The Board's investigation involved long-term leases and option and stock
agreements between the two carriers. After the carriers exchanged stock
and Pan American placed its National holdings in a voting trust, Pan
American applied for disclaimer of jurisdiction or in the alternative ap-
proval under section 408. The applicants argued that the trust device used
as an insulation from control of National was consistent with past cases
in which approval of the Board had been granted. The CAB stated that
there was a fundamental distinction between previous uses of the voting
trust and the Pan American-National situation. In the previous cases the
CAB had acquired jurisdiction over the control relationship and had
"approved a trust arrangement conditioned as it deemed necessary and
which it found satisfactory, on all the facts before it, to vindicate the pub-
lic interest."'" Pan American had attempted to escape the Board's jurisdic-
tion by setting up the trust, whose terms were self-prescribed, and by
asserting that the Board had no jurisdiction over the trust. In actuality the
carrier was trying to prevent the CAB from determining whether the re-
lationship was in the public interest.
In two recent cases before the Board, this position on voting trusts was
reinforced. In National Airlines, Inc. and Lewis B. Maytag Jr. Interlocking
Relationships2 both National and Maytag filed applications for Board
"Id. at 1365.
28 Discussed infra, section II-A.
29 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
" Pan American World Airways, Inc. and National Airlines, Inc., Agreements, 27 C.A.B. 611
(1958).31 
Id. at 623.
2CAB Docket No. 14121 (12 March 1964); CAB Order No. E-20700 (15 April 1964).
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approval of control under sections 408 and 409 of the act. Maytag owned a
controlling portion of National Airlines common stock and was at the same
time the beneficial owner of 48.98 percent of the total outstanding shares
of Maytag Aircraft Corporation and 1001 shares of 1003 outstanding
shares of Universal Service Corporation, a corporation engaged in a phase
of aeronautics, which were held in a voting trust. The applicants argued
that the voting trust was bona fide and was patterned virtually word-
for-word upon the trust agreement recommended and approved by the
Board in The Hughes-TWA-Atlas-Northeast Airlines Possible Common
Control Case.3" The examiner concluded that the applicants entered the
voting trust agreement believing in good faith that the arrangement
placed them outside the Board's jurisdiction, that they did not wish to
circumvent the Board's jurisdiction and that the Sherman Doctrine" was
inapplicable. However, the CAB stated in its order that "in the future it
will not view the creation of a voting trust as an excuse for failing to
seek Board action on relationships otherwise subject to section 408 or
409 of the act in advance of the establishment of the relationship or as a
ground for waiver of the Sherman Doctrine."3 The facts of the Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding' were essentially the same as May-
tag in that Allegheny purchased a majority of International Air Service's
common stock and placed it in a voting trust. The CAB followed the
reasoning in Maytag, dismissed the enforcement proceeding and ordered
a hearing pursuant to section 408 (b) of the act. 7
The West Coast Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding," recently de-
cided, involved the acquisition by West Coast Airlines of 296,240
shares of Pacific Airlines without prior Board approval. The stock was
immediately placed in a voting trust. The CAB Bureau of Enforcement
filed a complaint and petitioned for enforcement alleging violations of
section 408 of the act. The issue in these hearings was whether West Coast
Airlines had insulated itself from control of Pacific Airlines by placing the
stock in a voting trust. The CAB, by ruling that West Coast violated the
act, relied upon its recent rulings in the Maytag, 9 Allegheny,4 and Pan
"327 C.A.B. 155 (1958).
" Sherman, Control and Interlocking Relationships, 15 C.A.B. 876 (1952). In this proceeding
the Board promulgated the doctrine that an application under §5 408 or 409 of the act will
not be considered for approval as long as the action or relationship exists in apparent violation of
the act, whether or not the action would be found consistent with the public interest. The doctrine
could prove embarrassing due to the many business transactions which must be closed quickly.
Because of this fact the Board has in several instances of technical violations of the act found ex-
ceptional circumstances and has waived the Sherman Doctrine. See, e.g., CAB Order No. 13517
(13 Feb. 1959); CAB Order No. 13130 (3 Nov. 1958).
" Application of National Airlines, Inc. and Lewis B. Maytag Jr., CAB Order No. E-20700
(15 April 1964).
3 6 CAB Order No. E-20336 (6 Jan. 1964), modified, CAB Order No. 21280 (15 Sept. 1964).
3'72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (b) (Supp. V 1959-1963).
8CAB Order No. E-22248 (1 June 1965).
" National Airlines, Inc. and Lewis B. Maytag Jr. Interlocking Relationships, CAB Docket No.
14121 (12 March 1964); CAB Order No. E-20700 (15 April 1964).
4Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 14648 (15 Sept. 1964),
supra note 36.
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American" cases, because West Coast Airlines contested the Board's juris-
diction over the transaction.
The preceding examination of the use of the voting trust in the airline
industry demonstrates that the Board has approved the use of the voting
trust to insulate an airline from control by another airline when the trust
is utilized as a temporary measure pending divestiture and when the trans-
action is in the public interest. However, the Board apparently requires
certain provisions in the agreement and will not approve the use of the
voting trust to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Board.
II. SECTION 408 OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
Section 408 (a) (5) and (6) makes it unlawful for an air carrier or
any person engaged in any phase of aeronautics to acquire control of any
air carrier or any person engaged in any phase of aeronautics, without
approval of the CAB."' Under section 408 (a) (7) it is unlawful to main-
tain a relationship in violation of one of the preceding subdivisions."'
These provisions enunciate a well-established national policy that various
forms of transportation should be mutually independent." In short, "the
plain policy of section 408 (a) (5) is to make unlawful, in absence of the
Board's approval, the unified control of certain types of enterprises which
may have conflicting interests." 5 Section 408 (a) (5) becomes applicable
when control is acquired and the relationship or continuance of the rela-
tionship is unlawful unless the Board approves in accordance with section
408 (b). ' The standard used in applying section 408 (b) ' is the public
interest, which has been construed to be the public interest in direct rela-
tion to statutory objectives, not a mere general reference to public wel-
fare.4'
41 Pan American World Airways, Inc. and National Airlines, Inc. Agreements, 32 C.A.B. 611
(1958).
4272 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(5)-(7) (1958):
(a) It shall be unlawful unless approved by order of the Board as provided in this section -
(5) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any other common carrier,
or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to acquire control of any
air carrier in any manner whatsoever;
(6) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier to acquire control, in any
manner whatsoever, of any person engaged in any phase of aeronautics otherwise than
as an air carrier; or
(7) For any person to continue to maintain any relationship established in violation of
any of the foregoing subdivisions of this subsection.
4372 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (a) (7) (1958) supra note 42.
"Railroad Control of Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379 (1943); American Export Airlines, Inc.
-American Export Lines---Control-American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 619 (1942).
4 Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9 C.A.B. 473 (1948).
"72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (Supp. V. 1959-1963). The pertinent parts of this section
are as follows:
(b) Any person seeking approval of a consolidation . . .or acquisition of control, specified in
subsection (a) of this section, shall present an application to the Board, and thereupon the
Board shall notify the persons involved in the consolidation .. . or acquisition of control
.. .of the time and place of a public hearing. Unless, after such hearing, the Board finds
that the consolidation . . . or acquisition of control will not be consistent with the public
interest or that the conditions of this section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order approve
such consolidation . . .or acquisition of control. ...
'See generally Legislative Note, 35 Notre Dame Law. 131 (1959-1960).
48 Pan American Airways-Merger, 2 C.A.B. 503 (1940). For other decisions dealing with
section 408(b) see, e.g., National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, )Z1 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United
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A. Determinants Of Control
Three elements are necessary in order to vest the CAB with jurisdiction
under section 408 (a) (5). There must be an acquisition of control, the
party sought to be controlled must be an air carrier and the acquirer
must be engaged in a phase of aeronautics."' The Federal Aviation Act
does not specifically define control, but section 413 states, "For the pur-
pose of this title, whenever reference is made to control, it is immaterial
whether such control is direct or indirect."'" Due to the lack of definition
in the act, the statute raises serious questions such as: What is control?
How is control to be determined? What types of control can be exercised
over a corporation? Once control has been approved, can there be a further
acquisition of control by the same party, and (if so) does it require
approval?
As early as 1918, Mr. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo in Globe Woolen v.
Utica Gas &q Electric1 stated that a "dominating influence may be exerted
in other ways than through a vote." The courts have consistently held that
control is not a word of art, that it has no technical significance and, there-
fore, that the everyday meaning of the word must be utilized." In a famous
Federal Communications Commission case" the Commission found that
33.5 per cent of the voting stock was sufficient to control another cor-
poration when taken in conjunction with other factors. On appeal the
Supreme Court stated, "Investing [sic] the Commission with the duty of
ascertaining 'control' of one company by another, Congress did not imply
artificial tests of control. This is an issue of fact to be determined by the
special circumstances of each case."'" In leading cases concerning the con-
struction of control under section 408 (a) (5), the CAB has generally
followed the Court's reasoning. Railroad Control of Northeast Airlines"
presented the issue of whether two railroads had acquired control of
Northeast Airlines under section 408 (a) (5). The Board stated that the
term control "does not necessarily depend upon the ownership of any
specific minimum percentage of stock or other ownership rights. . .. "
A. L.-Western A. E., Interchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723 (1940); Acquisition of Marquette
by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 1 (1940), modified, Acquisition of Marquette by TWA-Supplemental Opinion,
2 C.A.B. 409 (1940). For an excellent discussion of § 408(b) see Barber, Airline Mergers,
Monopoly, and the CAB, 28 J. Air L. & Corn. 189, 219 (1961-62). For a thorough analysis of
§§ 408(a)(2) and (3) see generally Allen, Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act: A Study
in Agency Law Making, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1073 (1959).
4' Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Control by Hughes Tool Company, 6 C.A.B. 153,
155 (1944).
5072 Star. 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1383 (1958).
" 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378, 379 (1918), quoted, in Re Manchester Gas Co., 7 S.E.C. 557
(1940), and Railroad Control of Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379 (1943). See United States v.
Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61, 95 (1912) where the Court stated: "We are not unaware that .. .
there are other methods of control of a corporation than through such [majority of stock] owner-
ship." See also Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla
Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529 (6th Cir. 1915).
"'See Gulf Refining Co. v. Fox, 11 F. Supp. 425, 430 (S.D. W. Va. 1935); Eastern-Colonial
Control Case, 20 C.A.B. 629, 634 (1955).
"Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 3 F.C.C. 467 (1937), aff'd, 23 F. Supp. 634
(W.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
'4 307 U.S. at 145.
s54 C.A.B. 379 (1943).
'Old. at 381.
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The real test appears to be whether there exists a de facto power of domi-
nation of "one legal personality by another" under the particular facts
and circumstances of each individual case.
Shortly after the decision in the Northeast case, the CAB in Pan Ameri-
can Airways, Inc., Acquisition of Aeronaves de Mexico" reinforced its
position by ruling that control is a factual matter to be decided by
weighing all the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences and con-
clusions consistent with statutory objectives and purposes. The Board
quoted the Rochester and Globe Woolen cases, concluding that when con-
trol is used in public utility statutes without qualification, no artificial
restrictions are to be placed on the meaning of the word. The CAB again
reviewed the construction of the term in Pan American Airways Corpora-
tion, Acquisition of China National Aviation Corporation," citing the
Northeast and Aeronaves decisions as clearly interpreting "control" under
section 408.
The CAB's expansive view of control is illustrated by the Eastern-
Colonial Control Case." Here it said:
(1) control is an issue of fact determined by the special circum-
stances in each case;
(2) the voting of stock is not the only way that control can be
exercised;
(3) control does not depend upon the ownership of any specific
quantum of stock or other ownership rights but rather refers to the
amount of power and influence necessary to give one company actual
domination or substantial influence over another;
(4) control may be evidenced by power over another company's
stock through affiliates, close business association, or power over stock
holdings exercised in combination with other factors; and
(5) the term "control" embraces every form of control and may
cover a wide variety of situations of fact.
B. Further Acquisitions Of Control
The TWA-Toolco hearings have brought forth some of the most im-
portant rulings by the CAB in this area of the law. The Board's decision
in 1948"0 is an example of the logical progression of the broad construction
of the term "control" under section 408. The CAB initiated an investi-
gation into a letter agreement between TWA and Toolco which, if con-
summated, would increase Toolco's holdings in TWA. Because the Board
had previously granted approval of Toolco's control of TWA," the 1948
hearings were concerned with whether there had been further or addi-
tional acquisition of control within the meaning of section 408. The
Board ruled, as a matter of law, that there can be more than one acquisi-
57 4  C.A.B- 494 (1943).
's6 C.A.B. 143 (1944).
5"20 C.A.B. 629 (1955).
"Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Further Control by Hughes Tool Company, 9 C.A.B.
381 (1948).
"1 Transcontinental & Western Air Control by Hughes Tool Company, 6 C.A.B. 153 (1944).
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tion of control of an air carrier and that, even though one air carrier pres-
ently controls another, the Board's jurisdiction can be asserted when such
control is increased at a later time. The Board stated that approval of
control under a particular set of circumstances in a specific case relates
"to the quantum of control represented by the extent of ownership of
stock in the controlled company at the time of the application."" The
Board does not grant blanket unlimited in futuro approval of control
relationships, unless such approval is clearly specified. The CAB ruled
that an increased measure of control over TWA resulted from the con-
version feature of the notes provided for in the letter agreement.
The decisions of the courts and the CAB give a broad construction to
the term "control," to the effect that "when broadly construed, control
may embrace every form of control, actual or legal, direct or indirect,
negative or affirmative."" In short, both the courts and the CAB have
consistently held that the term "control" is not to be considered as an
unqualified or absolute concept, but involves the act or power of direc-
tion or domination under various circumstances.4
Il. CONTROL AND VOTING TRUSTS
A. CAB Requirements
Air carriers and persons engaged in phases of aeronautics have made
use of the voting trust whenever it was advantageous to divest themselves
of control of a second air carrier." Although recent decisions by the CAB
have dealt with control and voting trusts, the problem confronting the
Board is whether the beneficial owners of stock placed in a voting trust
are insulated from control of another air carrier. In considering this prob-
lem other questions arise in relation to the factors set down by the Board
for determining an acquisition of control. For example, do these essential
elements determine insulation from control by use of a voting trust?
What application, if any, does the common law of voting trusts have?
A related problem is whether approval of control, prior to the execution
of a voting trust agreement, constitutes approval upon the reassumption
of the voting interest in the stock.
The decision most frequently relied upon by those attempting to use
the voting device is The Hughes-TWA-Atlas-Northeast Airlines Possible
Common Control Case." The CAB, as previously mentioned, promulgated
"' Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Further Control by Hughes Tool Company, supra note
60 at 388.
" Railroad Control of Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379 (1943). For other decisions concerning
control see, e.g., American Airlines, Control of Mid Continent Airlines, 7 C.A.B. 365 (1946);
National--Caribbean-Atlantic Control Case, 6 C.A.B. 671 (1946); American Airlines Control
of American Export Airlines, 6 C.A.B. 371 (1945); Western Air Lines, Acquisition of Inland Air
Lines, 4 C.A.B. 654 (1944); Pan American Airways, Acquisition of Aerovias de Guatemala, 4
C.A.B. 403 (1943); American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16 (1940),
rev'd, Pan American Airways Co. v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941). Accord, SEC Rule 405,
17 C.F.R. S 230.405 (f) (Supp. 1947): "The term 'control' . . . means the possession, direct or
indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract or otherwise."
" For related questions under statutes administered by the SEC, see 2 Loss, Securities Regulation
764 (2d ed. 1961).
"SSee text accompanying note 10, sujra.
" 2 7 C.A.B. 155 (1958). See note 25 supra.
[Vol. 31
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
a voting trust agreement deemed acceptable as an insulation from con-
trol. The Board apparently considers the provisions of this agreement ade-
quate to remove the beneficial owner from any possible violation of sec-
tion 408 providing there are no other elements of control present. As
shown in Section II, supra, an air carrier or person engaged in a phase of
aeronautics cannot control another air carrier or person engaged in a
phase of aeronautics, without prior Board approval. How does this "model"
voting trust agreement accomplish this objective?
The first requirement is that the voting trust agreement be irrevocable.
The courts have held that a mere statement in the agreement that a trust
is irrevocable is insufficient to prevent termination by the sole settlor who
is the sole beneficiary. The trust agreement in the Hughes-Atlas case pro-
vided that the "voting trust is irrevocable and may not be terminated or
modified in any manner whatsoever without approval of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board.""5 It should be noted that Hughes had submitted himself
to the Board's jurisdiction and agreed to submit to any trust agreement
acceptable to the Board. The compulsion which Hughes was under from
the CAB is apparently sufficient to satisfy the requirement of irrevoc-
ability." The Board permits a provision granting the beneficial owner the
right to divest himself of the voting stock of the controlled corporation,
thereby revoking the trust. A divestiture by these means disposes of the
control problem which is the primary concern of the Board. In order to
satisfy the element of irrevocability, the CAB apparently requires that it
retain the power to approve modification or revocation of the voting
trust agreement.
The second provision which the CAB requires is that the stock of a
controlled corporation placed in a voting trust be voted in accordance
with the recommendations of the management of the controlled corpora-
tion. Although the CAB requires this provision in order to completely
divest a beneficial owner of control, it is questionable whether the require-
ment accomplishes this purpose. For example, should management be in-
fluenced by the person seeking insulation, such person could retain control
of the corporation. If the beneficial owner retained the power, in some
manner, to control the vote of the stock held in trust, even on specified
issues, he would clearly be in a position to exercise some measure of control
over the corporation whose stock was held in trust. Another undesirable
feature of this provision is the possible self-perpetuation of the manage-
ment. If the voting trustees are not allowed to vote in accordance with
their own discretion, they are in fact stripped of their voting powers, and
the management could perpetuate itself. Despite these objections, the CAB
requires this provision. The agreement in the Hughes-Atlas case provided
that the voting rights of the shares held in trust "shall be exercised by
:
7 H. M. Byllesby & Co. v. Droit, 25 Del. Ch. 46, 12 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1940).
'The Hughes-TWA-Atlas-Northeast Airlines Possible Common Control Case, 27 C.A.B, I55,
158 (1958).
,"Cf. Pacific-Greyhound-Lines--Control and Merger, 56 M.C.C. 415, 435, 436 (1950);
H. M. Byllesby & Co., and the Byllesby Corp., 6 $,,. , 63) (1940).
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the Trustee in accordance with the recommendations of the Atlas man-
agement as set forth in its proxy statement relating to the stockholder's
meeting."7 Provisions allowing the voting trustee to vote with the majority
of the stockholders or to abstain when deemed necessary, in his own inde-
pendent judgment, will apparently be scrutinized carefully, if not ruled
insufficient by the Board." Provisions permitting a majority of the voting
trustees to act for the voting trustees are questionable unless the majority
is appointed by someone other than the controlling shareholder. There
appear to be many instances when a trustee's independent discretion would
be the best device.
The third essential provision is that the beneficial owner completely
divest himself of the beneficial interest in the stock held in trust prior to
termination of the voting trust, unless other authorization is granted by
the CAB. This requirement is necessary to prevent control of the corpora-
tion whose stock is held in trust when the trust is terminated. This pro-
vision is indicative of the Board's view that voting trusts should be used
as a temporary measure while divestiture is being carried out by the con-
trolling company in order to comply with section 408. Should a person or
corporation be allowed to continue to own the stock after termination of
the voting trust, such a person would be in violation of section 408,
and the voting trust would accomplish no purpose in the eyes of the CAB.
By requiring this provision the Board merely confirms its position as to
one of the purposes of the voting trust which it presumes valid.
Another element required by the CAB is that settlors who acquire
additional voting rights during the life of the trust place such rights in
the voting trust. This provision is required in order that the settlor does
not acquire additional voting stock with which he might exercise some
measure of control.
A provision requiring the issuance of voting trust certificates to the
beneficial owner is also an essential element. Under most state statutes, a
voting trust agreement must provide for the issuance of voting trust
certificates and the CAB requires that such agreements be executed in com-
pliance with the applicable state law relating to voting trusts.
Finally, the CAB requires that the proposed trustees be neutral." If the
trustee is a bank or trust company, the beneficial owner cannot have had
any past or present business dealings with the institution. If the trustee ap-
pointed is an individual, past or present affiliation with the beneficial owner
will not be tolerated. These provisions attempt to insure that persons or
institutions appointed as voting trustees will not be subject to the will of
the beneficial owner when voting on corporate matters. If provisions of
70 The Hughes-TWA-Atlas-Northeast Airlines Possible Common Control Case, 27 C.A.B. 155,
159 (1958).
71 Brief for the Bureau of Enforcement, p. 28, West Coast Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Proceed-
ing, CAB Docket No. 14605 (28 June 1964).
72 Cf. the independent trustee provisions of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. 77jjj
(1958). See 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 729 (2d ed. 1961) for a discussion of these provisions in
the Trust Indenture Act.
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this nature were not required, it is possible that the beneficial owner could
exert pressure to influence the voting trustee's decisions.
The CAB can be expected to approve the use of a voting trust with
the preceding provisions, unless other elements of control exist, if the
person attempting to use the voting trust device submits himself to the
Board's jurisdiction and the Board finds the relationship to be in the
public interest.
B. Recent And Pending Hearings
The problems of jurisdiction and insulation from control are illus-
trated in the West Coast Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding"a recently
decided by the Board. In June 1963, without prior approval of the Board,
West Coast Airlines exercised an option to purchase 296,240 shares of
common stock of Pacific Airlines, or 34.8 per cent of the outstanding
shares. On 24 June 1963, a voting trust agreement was executed between
West Coast and the Wells Fargo Bank, involving the Pacific stock acquired
by West Coast. 4 West Coast's requested waiver of the Sherman Doctrine'
and approval of the voting trust was denied by the CAB. On 28 June
1963, the Bureau of Enforcement docketed a petition for enforcement and
a complaint alleging violations of section 408 (a) (5) and (7). On 5 Oc-
tober 1964, the Board refused to dismiss the enforcement proceeding
and on 1 June 1965 ruled that West Coast had violated the act, but that
a cease and desist order would not be in the public interest because on 18
May 1964 West Coast, by a bona fide sale, disposed of its Pacific stock.
West Coast had consistently denied that the Board had jurisdiction over
the proceeding, alleging that the voting trust had insulated it from con-
trol of Pacific because the Pacific stock was placed in a voting trust
immediately upon acquisition. Because of the recent decisions in Maytag"6
and Allegheny," the Board ruled that West Coast had violated the act
and decided a cease and desist order should not be issued. However, had
West Coast submitted to the Board's jurisdiction, the terms of the voting
trust in relation to control under section 408 would have been carefully
scrutinized. Control is a factual question to be determined in relation to
the special circumstances of each case." The 34.8 per cent ownership of
stock would have been immaterial to the Board's decision relating to con-
trol because the parties stipulated that this percentage standing alone con-
stitutes acquisition of control under section 408. The only issue would
have been whether West Coast could in any way influence or dominate the
actions of Pacific despite the existence of the voting trust.
"
3 CAB Order No. E-22248 (1 June 1965).
" Since the time of the original agreement the Wells Fargo Bank had been succeeded by the
Omaha National Bank as trustee.
"' Sherman, Control and Interlocking Relationships, 15 C.A.B. 876 (1952). See note 34 supra.
76 National Airlines, Inc. and Lewis B. Maytag Jr. International Relationships, CAB Docket No.
14121 (12 March 1964); CAB Order No. E-20700 (15 April 1964). See text accompanying
note 32 supra.
" Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Proceedng, CAB Order No, 21280 (15 Sept.
1964). See text accompanying note 36 supra.
78 See notes 53 & 54 supra and accompanying text.
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The trust agreement in West Coast simply stated that the trust is irre-
vocable. As previously shown, a provision of this nature is insufficient to
insulate a company from control by another.7 The Bureau of Enforcement
argued that there were several ways that the trust could be revoked." If
the trust was in fact revocable, West Coast could have at its convenience
dominated the corporate affairs of Pacific, and the trust would not have
insulated Pacific from control by West Coast. The trust granted the trustee
the power to vote the stock in the same manner as a majority of the stock-
holders, provided that in the exercise of its own independent judgment, the
trustee could have abstained from voting on any matter. This provision
apparently was an evolution from a provision that the trustee could at all
times exercise its independent judgment, except as to any proposal to con-
solidate or merge Pacific, which was contained in a trust agreement pre-
viously rejected by the Board. If a proposed merger or consolidation arose
the trustee was to vote in accordance with West Coast's instructions. 1 A
provision of this type was unacceptable, for a definite measure of control
over Pacific was retained by West Coast. The present provision, however,
appeared sufficient if no influence over the trustee was exercised by West
Coast. Any amount of influence as to voting rights would have provided
at least indirect control over Pacific.
The neutrality of the original trustee, the Wells Fargo Bank, had to
be maintained in order to insure insulation from control. If the trustee has
had close business associations with West Coast, these associations could
easily have represented sufficient power to control or influence Pacific. The
Bureau of Enforcement had stated that Wells Fargo was not a neutral
trustee 2 and that its subsequent resignation and the appointment of a
successor trustee would not cure the violation of section 408. The CAB
found, based on the examiner's initial decision, that even though voting
control was removed, other vestiges of control over Pacific remained with
West Coast, and absence of one of the preceding elements prevents insula-
tion from control.
The TWA-Toolco proceedings began in 1944 and have continued peri-
odically." The present hearings before the CAB are the result of the
financing arrangement executed in 1960."4 TWA requested modification of
79 See notes 67 & 68 supra and accompanying text.
80 Brief for the Bureau of Enforcement, p. 21, West Coast Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Pro-
ceeding, CAB Docket No. 14605 (28 May 1964). The Bureau pointed out that the trust was
revocable by (1) sale, (2) assignment and (3) default on a loan.
81 Brief for the Bureau of Enforcement, p. 28, supra note 80. Under the agreement West Coast
could control any merger of Pacific Airlines.
2 Brief for the Bureau of Enforcement, p. 30, supra note 80. A letter to the Wells Fargo Bank
indicated that the trustee was to work for a merger of West Coast and Pacific.
s"Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Control by Hughes Tool Company, 6 C.A.B. 153
(1944). In these proceedings the CAB approved Toolco's 45% interest in TWA. Since that time
further control of TWA by Toolco has been approved, so that at the present time Toolco owns
approximately 78.23% of the outstanding common stock. This motion was a culmination of pre-
viously filed motions. See CAB Order No. E-15430 (23 June 1960) and CAB Order No. E-15561
(21 July 1960).
"The principal features of the plan for financing the TWA jet fleet are: (1) delivery of
$72,200,000 principal amount of 6% Equipment Mortgage Serial Notes of TWA, to certain banks,
maturing serially 31 December 1961, and quarterly thereafter through 31 December 1964; (2)
issuance of $92,800,000 principal amount of 6'/a% Equipment Mortgages Sinking Fund Notes of
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a prior Board order to enable it to finance a fleet of jet aircraft. As part
of the arrangement the holders of TWA's Series A Sinking Fund Notes
granted non-transferable options to Toolco to purchase all, but not less
than all, of these notes, thereby giving Toolco the right to terminate the
voting trust."s The exercise of these options is subject to the condition
that, if the purchase requires the consent of any governmental authority,
such consent shall have been obtained. The CAB granted the requested
modification of its prior order, expressing the view that upon consumma-
tion of the arrangement fundamental changes in the control relationship
between TWA and Toolco would take place." The Board pointed out that
the directors of Toolco could no longer enforce their dictates "or those of
Toolco's controlling shareholder" on TWA. The Board further stated that
upon reassumption of control of TWA by Toolco, approval of the Board
under section 408 and a searching inquiry in relation to the public inter-
est factors involved would be anticipated."7
Toolco recently expressed a desire to exercise the options, acquire the
Series A Sinking Fund Notes, and terminate the voting trust. On 30 April
1964, Toolco filed a motion for disclaimer of jurisdiction over the
proposed exercise of the options, or in the alternative a modification of
the original order approving control and limiting the monetary trans-
actions between the two companies," or entry of an order under section
408 without a hearing. The Board ruled "that Toolco may exercise its
option to acquire the TWA Notes described herein at such time as it
submits a plan satisfactory to the Board which would effectively divest
Toolco of the power to simultaneously control both TWA and North-
east."'" The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
that the CAB should have held a hearing before issuance of its order per-
mitting Toolco to reassume control of TWA and that the Board's ruling
was an abuse of discretionary power and remanded the case to the CAB.
On 7 October 1964, Toolco filed a motion with the Board presenting a
plan to divest itself of control of Northeast Airlines. This plan included,
inter alia, a voting trust agreement. The CAB, on 25 March 1965, ruled
TWA, due 31 December 1972; and (3) issuance of $100 million principal amount of' interim
subordinated promissory notes of TWA to Toolco in payment of the amounts owing by TWA
to Toolco at interest rates not exceeding 790 to mature not earlier than 30 June 1973.
"5These options are exercisable at a price of 115% of their principal amount at the present
time. The original agreement provided for a 22% premium exercisable at that price until 31
March 1962. This premium is reduced one-half of one per cent for each preceding quarterly period.
See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
"0Trans World Air., Control by Hughes, 32 C.A.B. 1363 (1960).
"v In a footnote to the opinion the Board pointed out that the option agreement requires a sat-
isfactory opinion of counsel that the exercise of the option does not require government approval
or that such approval has been granted and is in force. This could not prevent dissolution of the
voting trust at the end of the ten year period, but the Board stated that Toolco could not resume
direct control of TWA without prior Board approval. Id. at 1365.
88Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Control by Hughes Tool Company, 6 C.A.B. 153
(1944).
"Hughes Tool Company, CAB Order No. E-21057 (10 July 1964). Toolco had previously
been granted approval for control of Northeast Airlines subsequent to the voting trust agreement.
See Toolco-Northeast Control Case, CAB Order No. E-18470 (19 June 1962), aff'd sub nom.,
National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 321 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
"Trans World Airlines v. C.A.B., 339 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1964).
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that the Northeast voting trust was insufficient to divest Toolco's holdings
in Northeast. The Board stated that the trust provided for financial
assistance to Northeast by Toolco, and that it must be assumed that
Northeast's management "will defer to Toolco's wishes since Toolco may
be Northeast's only significant source of further financial aid."'" The
CAB apparently felt that Toolco retained the power to control North-
east. The Board must now decide whether Toolco still controls TWA even
though the majority stock interest is presently held in trust, whether
Toolco has relinquished control of TWA by the use of the voting trust,
and whether reassumption or reacquisition of the voting interest in the
stock necessitates approval by the Board under section 408 of the act.
These problems are further complicated by the Toolco holdings in North-
east, for Toolco must divest itself of the interest before the CAB will rule
on the reacquisition or reassumption of control over TWA. These prob-
lems must be viewed in relation to the provisions of the voting trust
agreement, the tests promulgated by the Board which constitute acquisition
or insulation from control, and the public interest factors.
TWA argues that Toolco has been divested of control of TWA by
means of the voting trust and that a hearing on the public interest factors
involved must be held before Toolco can reacquire control of TWA. In
short, TWA contends that the prior orders of the Board9 granting ap-
proval of control of TWA by Toolco are no longer in effect, and Board
approval must now be granted in order for Toolco to reacquire con-
trol. TWA further alleges that Toolco wishes to reacquire TWA for
the purpose of preventing prosecution by TWA of other suits presently
pending against Toolco.9
Toolco contends that its use of the voting trust has not insulated it
from control of TWA and that prior orders of the Board approving its
control of TWA are still effectual. Based on this contention Toolco desires
to exercise its option to purchase the Series A Sinking Fund Notes,
terminate the voting trust, and reassume control of TWA without Board
approval.
The 1960 voting trust agreement between Toolco, TWA and the Voting
Trustees does not appear to insulate TWA from control by Toolco within
the meaning of section 408 of the act. The CAB considers irrevocability
an essential factor in determining insulation from control.9 The trust
9' Wall Street Journal, 26 March 1965, p. 4, col. 2.
92Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Control by Hughes Tool Company, 6 C.A.B. 153
(1944); Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Further Control by Hughes Tool Company, 9
C.A.B. 381 (1948); TWA-Further Control by Hughes Tool Company, 12 C.A.B. 192 (1950).
9 TWA brought an anti-trust suit against Hughes seeking damages, divestiture of the TWA
stock held by Toolco and injuries suffered as a result of violations of the antitrust laws. A default
judgment in this case was rendered in the amount of $45,000,000 before statutory trebling. See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 32 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1964), noted, 31 J. Air L. & Com. 47 (1965),
cert. dismissed, 33 U.S.L. Week 3295 (U.S. 8 March 1965). Another suit is presently pending
against Toolco and Hughes in the Chancery Court of the State of Delaware, Newcastle County.
TWA seeks some $35,000,000 in damages, based upon alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Jurisdiction
has been obtained, Toolco has filed counterclaims, and discovery proceedings have been stayed
pending appeal in the federal case.
" See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
O'See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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indenture makes no mention of irrevocability and does not attempt to
make the trust irrevocable."6 The agreement states that it shall terminate
on the earliest of the following dates: (1) 15 December 1970, unless the
agreement is extended as provided; (2) the date on which the trustee
under the Note Indenture executes an instrument acknowledging satis-
faction or discharge of the same; or (3) the date on which an instrument
is delivered to TWA, signed by the Notes Agent, terminating the agree-
ment. The provision for termination by the Notes Agent relates to the
option granted Toolco to purchase the Series A Sinking Fund Notes. If
Toolco purchases the notes, it would have the power to direct the Agent
to terminate the agreement, because the holders of these notes irrevocably
agreed to terminate the agreement when TWA discharges the notes. It
is apparent that this voting trust is revocable because of the option which
Toolco may exercise at its discretion. 7
The voting rights of the trustee under the agreement are an important
factor in the determination of control. It is provided in the trust in-
denture that the action of a majority of the trustees9 shall constitute the
action of the trustees. The trustees are to act in the exercise of their sole
and absolute discretion. This provision attempts to assure that the stock
will be voted in accordance with the management of TWA, since the
directors are elected by the shareholders, a majority of whose stock is
held in the voting trust. Whether this provision complies with the CAB's
requirement is questionable because it is possible for the voting trustees to
vote contrary to the views of TWA's management. However, as discussed
earlier, the trustee's independent discretion in many instances is the better
provision. There is no provision in the agreement requiring divestiture of
the Toolco holdings prior to the termination of the trust as required by
the Board for insulation from control. Because this agreement was executed
for purposes of financing, there is no reason why a provision of this type
should be included in the trust indenture. Neutrality of the trustee or
trustees is a stringent requirement of the CAB which appears to be absent
from this agreement. Two trustees were appointed by the financial insti-
tutions which hold the Series A Sinking Fund Notes and the other trustee
was appointed by Toolco. Toolco, by virtue of this provision, controls
one-third of the voting trustees and the trustees as such cannot be termed
neutral.
The courts have consistently held that stock ownership is not the only
way that control of a corporation can be exercised. Toolco apparently
can exercise its option to purchase the outstanding notes, and together
with its representation among the trustees, is in possession of a definite
measure of control. There was a change in the control by Toolco when
" It should be noted that the purpose of this voting trust agreement was to secure financing
for TWA and not to insulate TWA from control by Toolco.
97 See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
" One of the three trustees was appointed by Toolco and the other two trustees were appointed
by the holders of TWA's Series A Sinking Fund Notes. Present holders of the Notes are (1)
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, (2) Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
and (3) Irving Trust Company (as agent for itself and a group of banks).
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the voting trust was executed. However, Toolco still exercises a significant
influence over TWA.
The preceding examination of the voting trust agreement indicates that
certain elements of control have been retained by Toolco despite the voting
trust agreement; however, Toolco has apparently given up working con-
trol of TWA to the voting trustees. The Second Circuit has ruled that
the CAB must hold a hearing under section 408 (b) to determine whether
Toolco's proposed acquisition of the TWA stock is in the public interest."
The court did not expressly find that there would be an acquisition of
control by Toolco, if the option was exercised and the voting trust
terminated. However, the court did imply that there would be an acquisi-
tion of control and that the CAB had itself expressed this opinion.' 0
The working control of TWA was relinquished. Upon exercise of the
option by Toolco, the reassumption of working control is a further
acquisition of control within the meaning of section 408 (a) (5). Under
the unique circumstances of this case, control of TWA by Toolco existed,
was partially given up, and now will be reacquired upon exercise of the
option and cancellation of the voting trust. The voting trust insulated
Toolco from working control of TWA but reacquisition of this working
control constitutes a further acquisition of control under section
408 (a) (5) which requires a hearing under section 408 (b) to determine
whether such acquisition is in the public interest. Since the jurisdiction
of the CAB rests, inter alia, on an acquisition of control, the Board can
be expected to find that there was a further acquisition by Toolco over
TWA.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the somewhat confused development of the voting trust device
in the airline industry, it is possible to classify the decisions of the CAB
in relation to the use of the device. Voting trusts have been used by airlines
and persons engaged in phases of aeronautics to divest themselves of con-
trol of air carriers whenever they felt that it was to their advantage.
Attempts have been made to avoid the jurisdiction of the CAB under
section 408 of the act by placing a controlling block of stock in a voting
trust and denying that the Board has the power to approve or disapprove
the control relationship involved. The voting trust has also been utilized as
a temporary measure to provide the controlling company with an oppor-
tunity to divest itself of the controlling interest of another airline's stock.
Finally, the voting trust has been used in financing arrangements. The
CAB has announced its position on some of the above mentioned uses of
the voting trust in relation to control and insulation from control and
can be expected to clarify the remaining questions in the near future.
When the Board detects that a voting trust is being used to circumvent
its jurisdiction under section 408 of the act, it will find that the company
is in violation of section 408 (a) (7). Previously, when a company entered
99 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 339 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1964).
'oo See note 87 sutra and accompanying text.
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into a voting trust prior to Board approval of the control relationship,
believing in good faith that the agreement placed it outside the Board's
jurisdiction when in fact it did not, the Board held the Sherman Doctrine"1
inapplicable and processed the case on its merits under section 408 (b).
The Board has stated that in the future it will not view the creation of a
voting trust as an excuse for failure to seek advance Board approval of
relationships otherwise subject to sections 408 and 409. In short, the Board
will not allow the voting trust to defeat its jurisdiction and prevent it
from making a decision in relation to the public interest factors under
section 408 (b).
Historically the CAB has approved the use of the voting trust as a
temporary measure until a company can divest itself of a controlling block
of stock. Apparently, the Board will continue its approval of this use of
the voting trust. However, when it is used in this manner, the Board
will require that the voting trust agreement comply with the agreement
set out in The Hughes-TWA-Atlas-Northeast Airlines Possible Common
Control Case, °2 which presumably insulates one company from control
by another provided no other elements of control exist. The use of the
voting trust for financing purposes is apparently acceptable by the CAB.
Although this particular use of the device does not directly involve con-
trol or insulation from control, it can lead to some very complicated
problems as seen in the pending TWA-Toolco proceedings.
The single most important factor in relation to voting trusts, as viewed
by the CAB, is that it have jurisdiction over the voting trust, no matter
what the purpose of the trust. Insulation from control by use of the voting
trust can be accomplished only when the requisites of the Board are met
in the voting trust agreement and no other elements of control are pres-
ent. The CAB has indicated that, when considering a control relationship,
each voting trust will be examined in relation to the facts present in each
case. The Board can be expected to follow this case-by-case approach in
a manner consistent with the preceding policies. This approach seems to be
the most acceptable, for control is a factual matter to be determined by
the circumstances present in each case.
Edward A. Peterson
101 See note 34 supra.
10227 C.A.B. 155 (1958) at 157.
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Jurisdiction - Vexatious Litigation - State Injunction
Against Federal Suit
In early 1961, the City of Dallas, Texas, announced its decision to
build an additional runway at its overloaded municipal airport, Dallas
Love Field. A group of forty-six local property owners, including their
attorney James P. Donovan, brought a class action on 3 April 1961 seeking
to enjoin the building of the runway on various grounds. A Dallas County
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the city.1 During
the pendency of the case, and while the property owners exhausted all
possible appellate opportunities, the City of Dallas was prevented from
proceeding with issuance of bonds and, for lack of funds, from construc-
tion of the runway. Texas law requires the state Attorney General to
certify the validity of airport revenue bonds before they may be issued,'
but the Attorney General will not certify if there is any pending litigation
concerning or affecting such bonds. After this litigation had run its
course, the city obtained certification of its bond issue. However, on 24
September 1962, the day bids on the bonds were to be received, attorney
Donovan filed suite in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas. The plaintiffs were 120 Dallas citizens, including Dono-
van, twenty-seven of whom were plaintiffs in the original class action.
The filing of this action prevented the city from issuing the bonds,4 and
faced with another long delay in getting the runway project underway,
the city sought a writ of prohibition from the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals' to prevent Donovan and the other plaintiffs from prosecuting
the case in federal court. The Court of Civil Appeals refused to issue
such orders, but a petition for mandamus to the Supreme Court of Texas
brought a reversal7 and the Court of Civil Appeals duly issued a writ
of prohibition on 16 April 1963.' After Donovan contested the city's
Affirmed, Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), error ref. n.r.e.
(Tex. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
2Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1269j-5, § 3 (1963). "The Revenue Bonds . . . shall not be
finally issued until approved by the Attorney General of Texas .... "
sBrown v. City of Dallas, Civil Cause 9276, N.D. Texas, 24 September 1962.
'Because no one would bid on them while such a suit was pending. This suit was filed just
hours before the bids were to be received. Brief for Respondent, pp. 5, 31, Donovan v. City of
Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
' The Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District sitting at Dallas is one
of thirteen intermediate civil appellate courts in the Texas judicial system.
'City of Dallas v. Brown, 362 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
"City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1963).
The Writ of Prohibition read in part as follows:
It is . . . ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the said James P.
Donovan, individually and as attorney . . . of the Respondents . . . and the Re-
spondents . . . individually and as a class of taxpayers and residents and landowners
in the vicinity of Love Field, together with all other persons similarly situated, are
hereby prohibited from prosecuting, urging or in any manner seeking to litigate,
152
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motion to dismiss in the federal court9 and appealed the dismissal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,"0 the Court of Civil
Appeals found Donovan and eighty-seven of his clients guilty of con-
tempt of court." After serving his jail sentence, Donovan obtained a writ
of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court directed to the Su-
preme Court of Texas and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals."2 Held: The
state court was without power to enjoin petitioners' in personam action
from being relitigated in the federal court."3 Donovan v. City of Dallas,
377 U.S. 408 (1964).
The problems of repetitious and vexatious litigation and multiplicity
of suits have troubled the courts since the early days of the federal sys-
tem. "Vexatious litigation" and the power of the courts to deal with it
as attorney and/or plaintiffs . . . Brown v. City of Dallas, now pending in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division,
and they . . . are further prohibited and enjoined from filing or instituting any
litigation, lawsuits or other actions seeking to contest the right of the City of Dallas
to proceed with the construction of the parallel runway as presently proposed at Love
Field . . . or from instituting and prosecuting any further litigation, lawsuits or
actions in any court, the purpose of which is to contest the validity of the airport
revenue bonds heretofore issued . . . or that might be issued . . for the con-
struction of the . . . runway ....
Although the writ is entitled "Writ of Prohibition and Ancillary Orders," it is in reality an
injunction, as that extraordinary remedy is commonly understood. See High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, §§ 762-63 (1874). Eden, Injunctions 14 (2d Amer. ed. 1839) states that:
A prohibition . . . issues only from a superior court . . . and is directed to the judge
of the inferior court, as well as to the parties in the cause. An injunction on the other
hand, where its object is to restrain proceedings in another court, is directed only to
the parties; neither assumes any superiority over the court in which they are pro-
ceeding, nor denies its jurisdiction; but is granted on the sole ground that from certain
equitable circumstances, of which the court that issues it has cognizance, it is against
conscience or [sic] the party to proceed in the cause.
While agreeing that the title of the writ was technically incorrect, the Supreme Court of Texas
states:
[I]ncorrect identity of the writ sought is of no significance. Relators seek from the
Court of Civil Appeals a writ directing the plaintiffs and their attorney to desist
from further prosecution of Brown v. City of Dallas in the United States District
Court. If they are entitled to that relief, necessary and proper writs, by whatever
names they may be called, should be issued. City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d
919, 922 (Tex. 1963).
Later in the same opinion, the Texas Supreme Court cautioned that:
The Court of Civil Appeals may not, however, order or direct dismissal of Brown
v. City of Dallas. A suit cannot be dismissed from the docket of a court without an
order of the court; and any writ directing dismissal of Brown v. City of Dallas would
invade the jurisdiction of the United States District Court to control its own docket.
Id. at 927.
' Donovan filed an answer to the city's motion to dismiss, and excepted to the court's dismissal.
"0 Donovan also requested the District Court to enjoin the Texas courts from interfering with
the federal suit. Donovan v. Supreme Court of Texas, Civil Cause CA-3-63-120, N.D. Texas,
dismissed, 9 May 1963; cert. denied, 375 U.S. 878 (1963).
"City of Dallas v. Brown, 368 S.W,2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). Eighty-seven of the
clients were each fined $200 while attorney Donovan was given the maximum sentence of
twenty days imprisonment in the county jail. Both the Supreme Court of Texas and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied applications for writ of habeas corpus which
Donovan sought while in jail. (No opinions).
12 Donovan v. City of Dallas, 375 U.S. 878 (1963).
" The judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas in the mandamus action was reversed and
that of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in the contempt proceedings was vacated. The case was
remanded to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals to determine whether it "would have punished
petitioners for contempt had it known that the restraining order . . . was invalid." In succeeding
hearings, the Texas court held that it would not have, and refunded the fines. Brown v. City of
Dallas, 384 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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has been variously defined." ' A discussion of the Connecticut court con-
tains one of the better definitions:
It is well settled that equity may enjoin vexatious litigation.... This power
of equity exists independently of its power to prevent a multiplicity of
actions. It is based on the fact that it is inequitable for a litigant to harass
an opponent, not for the attainment of justice, but out of malice. To be
vexatious, litigation must be prosecuted not only without probable cause
but also with malice."5
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Texas made a specific finding
that the litigation over the runway had "reached the point of vexatious
and harassing litigation.""4
Mr. Justice Black, in the majority opinion, posed the question to be
decided as "whether a state court can validly enjoin a person from prose-
cuting an action in personam in a district or appellate court of the United
States which has jurisdiction both of the parties and of the subject mat-
ter."17 Citing cases which pertain to instances of in rem or in personam
simultaneous litigation,"s but which did not consider vexatious litigation,
the Court ignored state and federal precedents to the contrary," and ruled
14 See, e.g., Meredith v. John Deere Plow Co., 261 F.2d 121, 124 (8th Cir. 1958); Calvo v.
Bartolotta, 112 Conn. 396, 152 At. 311 (1930); Poole v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 44 So. 2d
467, 476 (Miss. 1950); O'Laughlin v. O'Laughlin, 6 N.J. 170, 78 A.2d 64, 68 (1951); Thomp-
son v. Samson United Corp. 203 Misc. 48, 113 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (Sup. Ct. 1952). Cf., Vestal,
Repetitive Litigation, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 525 (1960).
15 Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Pearson, 139 Conn. 186, 91 A.2d 778, 781 (1952).
" City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919, 927 (Tex. 1963).
" 377 U.S. at 408.
"5Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939) (quasi-in rem actions involving a trust)
and Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1923) (in personam actions). Reliance by the
majority upon these two cases is the basis of the Donovan dissent's conclusion that "today's decision
rests upon confusion between two distinct lines of authority in this Court, one involving vexatious
litigation and the other not." 377 U.S. at 421. Indeed, the language of the Court in Kline presents
an excellent argument contrary to the instant Court's majority opinion:
The rule, therefore, that the court first acquiring jurisdiction shall proceed with-
out interference from a court of the other jurisdiction is a rule of right and of law
based upon necessity, and where the necessity, actual or potential, does not exist, the
rule does not apply. Since the necessity does exist in actions in rem and does not
exist in actions in personam, involving a question of personal liability only, the rule
applies in the former but does not apply in the latter. 260 U.S. at 235. (Emphasis
supplied).
The instant case would certainly appear to present the "actual or potential necessity" required to
support the rule and Dallas' much-needed multi-million dollar runway construction which had to
abide the final settlement of the litigation involved much more than personal liability. More than
two years had already elapsed when the Texas Court of Civil Appeals issued its injunction. Even
so, the runway was not opened to traffic until 2 April 1965.
The litigation concerning the Dallas Love Field runway continues. Three weeks after the new
runway was opened to traffic, Donovan filed suit on behalf of forty-five plaintiffs in federal
district court seeking to enjoin the use of the runway until the City of Dallas purchases the air
rights of the homeowners involved. Crudgington v. League, Civil No. CA 4-442, N. D. Texas, 24
April 1965. Defendants are the City of Dallas, the Federal Aviation Agency, FAA Administrator
Najeeb Halaby, and Archie League, regional administrator of the FAA.
"
9 Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941) (dictum); Root v. Woolworth, 150
U.S. 401 (1893); Reagan v. Dick, 76 Colo. 544, 233 Pac. 159 (1925); Poole v. Mississippi Publishers
Corp., 44 So. 2d 467 (Miss. 1950); University of Texas v. Morris, 162 Tex. 60, 344 S.W.2d 426
(1961). Contra, Lyons v. Importers' and Traders' Nat. Bank, 214 Pa. 428, 63 At. 827 (1906).
There are also many cases discussing the right of the federal courts to enjoin state courts to protect
their judgments. See, e.g., Marks v. Pennsylvania R.R., 8 F.R.D. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). For an
exhaustive listing of cases see Note, State Injunctions Against Proceedings in the Federal Courts, 90
U. Pa. L. Rev. 714 (1942).
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that the Texas state court was powerless to protect its judgment through
injunction.' °
The authors of the Judiciary Act of 1793, concerned with preserving
the independence of the state courts, included a provision in section 5
prohibiting the federal courts from issuing any injunction to stay the
proceedings of a state court." Several early cases cited in Donovan illus-
trate the reluctance of the state and federal courts to interfere with each
other but none of these deals with the matter of vexatious litigation.'
Because of the reluctance of the federal and state courts to interfere
with each other, there are not many holdings in the area of vexatious litiga-
tion. There is sufficient precedent, however, to indicate that the Supreme
Court in the instant case is not restating existing law, but is, to the con-
trary, setting new rules. The Court ventured into this area in Toucey v.
New York Life Ins. Co.," when it held that a federal court did not have
the power to stay a proceeding in a state court merely because the claim
in controversy had been previously adjudicated in the federal court. Several
justices dissented, their dissent becoming the basis for a congressional
overruling of the Toucey holding in the 1948 revision of the Judicial
Code."5 Furthermore, as the dissent in Donovan points out, the Court
had previously announced in dictum in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, s
that a state court had precisely the power exercised by the Texas court.
Not only did the majority opinion in Kepner indicate the Court's recog-
nition of such power, 7 but Mr. Justice Frankfurter also stated in his dis-
sent that the majority did "not deny the historic power of courts of
equity to prevent a misuse of litigation by enjoining resort to vexatious
20377 U.S. at 413.
"... nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a
state. ... I Stat. 335 (1793). An amendment in 1911 permitted injunctions where authorized by
any law relating to bankruptcy proceedings. 36 Stat. 1162 (1911).
22 The court cited M'Kim v. Voorhies, 2 U.S. (7 Cranch) 529 (1812) and Diggs v. Wolcott,
2 U.S. (4 Cranch) 63 (1807). As the dissent points out, the issue in M'Kim was whether a state
court could stay proceedings on a federal court's judgment which had already been rendered when
the state court acquired jurisdiction, while the Diggs situation was identical except the position of
the courts was reversed. Neither of these cases involved harassment or vexatious litigation.
22314 U.S. 118 (1941).
24 Mr. Justice Reed's dissent, concurred in by Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Chief Justice Stone,
contended that the controlling issue was the "power of a federal court to protect those who have
obtained its decrees against an effort to force relitigation of the same causes of action in the state
courts. Questions of res judicata seem inapposite for the conclusion." (Emphasis supplied). 314
U.S. at 141.
2 The Judicial Code now allows a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings when neces-
sary "to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958). The Reviser's notes to
§ 2283 state that:
The exceptions specifically include the words "to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments," for lack of which the Supreme Court held that the Federal courts are with-
out power to enjoin relitigation of cases and controversies fully adjudicated by such
courts. (See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co. . . . vigorous dissenting opinion. .... )
Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally understood and
interpreted prior to the Toucey decision. Ibid.
'4314 U.S. 44 (1941).27 1d. at 51:
The real contention of petitioner is that, despite the admitted venue, [arising under
the Federal Employers Liability Act] respondent is acting in a vexatious and inequit-
able manner in maintaining the federal court suit. . . : Under such circumstances,
petitioners assert power, abstractly speaking, in the Ohio court to prevent a resident
under its jurisdiction from doing inequity. Such power does exist. (Emphasis supplied).
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and oppressive foreign suits."'" He further mentioned the "discredited
notion that there is a general lack of power in the state courts to enjoin
proceedings in federal courts.''"
The view has long been held that a court of equity could enjoin vex-
atious, harassing litigation. Even in Toucey, the basis for the Court's
holding was an interpretation of congressional intent in the provisions of
the Judicial Code.' The Supreme Court itself said in Insurance Co. v.
Bailey" that it was unnecessary to cite authorities for the proposition that
"equity will interfere to restrain irreparable mischief, or to suppress op-
pressive and interminable litigation, or to prevent multiplicity of suits"
because it was "universally admitted."3 A number of early writers rein-
forced the view that equity has long exercised the power to enjoin vex-
atious litigation. High, in his 1905 treatise on injunctions, said that while
there was no reason why state courts could not interfere by injunction to
restrain actions in the federal courts, the state courts had generally re-
fused to do so." Pointing out that the doctrine had been asserted that
"state courts are wholly destitute of any power or authority for such
interference," High argued that the better doctrine is that the state courts
may protect their jurisdiction when it has attached over the controversy,
by enjoining "parties who are amenable to their process and subject to
their jurisdiction from afterward litigating the same subject in the federal
courts."' ' Story, on the other hand, said in 1836 that "the state courts
cannot injoin [sic] proceedings in the courts of the United States; nor
the latter in the former courts." He concluded that this exception to the
general rule that courts of equity may enjoin vexatious litigation was
based upon "peculiar grounds of municipal and constitutional law," but
cited no precedents for this sweeping statement. 5
The Texas view on vexatious litigation had been established before the
state supreme court ruled in Donovan. In University of Texas v. Morris,"
the supreme court allowed a state district court to issue an injunction re-
straining prosecution of a suit by Morris in the New Mexico federal
district court because he had already filed several suits on the identical
matter in the state district court. Regardless of the various arguments
as to comity and non-interference between state and federal courts, it is
hard to fault the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Texas when it says:
While the courts are open to all persons for the litigation of their claims
and demands, the judicial processes cannot be used for purposes of mere
harassment in an effort to effect settlements. While the injunction
11Id. at 55.
"1Id. at 56.
30314 U.S. at 139. See note 21 supra.
2580 U.S. 616 (1871).
aId. at 621.
31 High, Injunctions § 111 at 127 (4th ed. 1905).
I Id. at 128.
"Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 900 (1st ed. 1836). For an interesting discussion of the back-
ground of Story's "dogma" and the lack of precedent to support it, see Note, 90 U. Pa. L. Rev.
714, especially at 715 and 728 (1942).
3" 162 Tex. 60, 344 S.W.2d 426 (1961).
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should be employed sparingly and with care, the evidence here supports the
trial judge's action. Morris has been deprived of no legal rights. He is free
to litigate his claim ... in the district court of the county where the trans-
actions ... took place. But he may not be permitted to file repeated suits
in various forums for harassment purposes.
Though the Supreme Court set a precedent of dubious value in Dono-
van, it must be admitted that there are many sound reasons for jealously
protecting the independence of the state and federal courts. It would
be intolerable if a state and a federal court could tit-for-tat enjoin
proceedings in the other court, thus leaving the plaintiff with no forum
at all. However, it is difficult to understand why different rules apply to
the state and federal courts in this matter. It appears clear that had the
positions of the courts in Donovan been reversed, an injunction by the
federal court would have been justified under section 2283." Indeed, a
strong argument can be made that the Judiciary Act of 1793 and the pres-
ent Judicial Code both amount to limitations on what would otherwise be
an unquestioned right of both state and federal courts to enjoin vexatious
litigation regardless of where it is filed." Under the present Judicial Code,
it is clear that a federal court may, as an exercise of its equitable discre-
tion, protect or effectuate its judgment by enjoining proceedings in other
courts, both state and federal, which constitute relitigation of matters
already adjudged or which in some other manner impairs the effect of
the judgment.'
Before the Donovan decision, there were several theories generally ad-
vanced as to why state courts, under no restrictions comparable to those
imposed on the federal courts by the predecessors to section 2283, gen-
erally refused to enjoin federal court proceedings. One is based upon the
idea that in order to achieve harmonious relationship between the two
court systems, it is necessary that each observe the same general rules.
Since the federal courts have been limited in injunctive power since 1793,1
reciprocity would require the state courts to observe much the same limi-
tations.42 The other doctrine is similar, but couched in terms of comity;
that, although in absence of statute neither is limited in injunctive power,
since the federal courts have been limited by Congress the state courts
bind themselves to the same rules under a doctrine of judicial comity.4 1
The Court brushes aside the contention that the writ of prohibition"
of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals was directed to the parties, and not
"r 344 S.W.2d at 429.
'8 See note 25 supra.
"Cf. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, note 19 supra, at 53.
"°Williams v. Pacific Royalty Co., 247 F.2d 672, 675 (10th Cir. 1957); Berman v. Denver
Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 1952); Jackson v. Carter Oil Co., 179 F.2d 524,
526 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 812 (1950). 1 Moore, Federal Practice 0.224 at 2614
(1961).
41 See note 21 supra.
42 Note, Limitations on State Judicial Interference with Federal Activities, 51 Colum. L. Rev.
84 (1951).
"'See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1930); Note, 90
U. Pa. L. Rev. 714 (1942).
" See extended discussion of the writ at note 8, supra.
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to the federal court," but the case cited" as authority in so doing is
clearly distinguishable (as the dissent cogently points out)."' It would
appear that the better rule is the one announced by the 8th Circuit in
Meredith v. John Deere Plow Co." The court, in affirming the district
court's issuance of an injunction to prevent vexatious litigation, stated
that the answer to the appellant's contention that it was unconstitutional
for a federal court to prohibit the institution of a suit in state court was
"that the injunction issued does not reach at action on the part of a state
court but at action on the part of appellant."" On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has stated several times that the fact "that the injunction
was a restraint of the parties and was not formally directed against the
state court itself is immaterial,"'" so the holding on this point is not a
surprise.
The Court's reliance upon Princess Lida v. Thompson" and Kline v.
Burke Construction Co." in stating that it was for the federal court to
decide "whether or not a plea of res judicata in the second suit would be
good" appears to be misplaced.' The rule of these cases undoubtedly
supports the Court's statement, but neither Princess Lida nor Kline is in
point with the instant case. Both cases concerned simultaneous litigation
in state and federal courts concerning the same subject matter, but in
which neither state nor federal court had reached a decision. In Donovan,
the state litigation was completed" before the federal suit was filed. There-
fore, the only issue was whether filing the federal suit was vexatious and
harassing. The Texas Supreme Court's holding that it was should have
been conclusive and the federal district judge agreed, saying:
The issues that are sought to be litigated in the case in the Federal Court
have been held by the [Texas] Supreme Court to be the same as the issues
which have been litigated in the Atkinson case .... [T]here is no justiciable
issue, . . . all the issues have been decided .... [Y]ou are attempting to make
me an Appellate Court for the Supreme Court . . . [but] your appeal is to
the Supreme Court of the United States and not to this Court."
4' 377 U.S. at 413.
"Peck v. Jenness, 17 U.S. (7 How.) 320, 327 (1848).
","In Peck v. Jenness, . . . the question . . . was whether a federal court 'was vested with
any power or authority to oust' a state court of its properly established jurisdiction over a cause
commenced in the state court long before any action was taken in the federal court." 377 U.S.
at 429.
4s 261 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).
41Id. at 125.
"Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1940); Hill v. Martin,
296 U.S. 393 (1935).
5' See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
52 Ibid.
5a 377 U.S. at 412.
"6 In its brief, the City of Dallas pointed out that "in this case a plea of Yes judicata is not an
adequate remedy because the mere filing of the unmeritorious relitigation complaint has the instant
effect of destroying the efficacy of the Texas court's judgment allowing construction of the runway
and sale of the bonds." Brief for Respondent, p. 21. The dissent agreed. 377 U.S. at 415.
s See note 1 supra.
See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
"Brown v. City of Dallas, Civil Cause 9276, N.D. Tex., 2 May 1963. (oral opinion unre-
ported).
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The instant decision applies, in effect, a double standard to the power
of state and federal courts to protect and effectuate their judgments. It
provides a weapon whereby persons opposed to public projects such as
the Dallas airport addition in Donovan may use the courts to harass and
delay. The method utilized by the plaintiffs is clear enough: file the case
first in state court and exhaust every possible appeal, delaying each as
much as possible. Then, refile in federal court, alleging a federal cause
of action involving the same subject matter or diversity of citizenship and
the whole process begins anew. Allowing this procedure will lead to un-
fortunate and unwarranted results. A small group should not be per-
mitted to defeat the public's welfare through continuous, vexatious and
harassing litigation. Congress repudiated a similar holding in Toucey;s
it should do so again.
Charles A. Thompson
58 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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Federal Courts - Change of Venue - Section 1404(a)
As a result of a commercial airliner crash in Massachusetts on 4 October
1960, numerous wrongful death actions were instituted by personal rep-
resentatives in the United States District Court for Massachusetts and in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In each forum venue was proper and diversity jurisdiction requirements
had been met.1 The defendants moved to transfer all the actions brought
by personal representatives in Pennsylvania to the federal district court
in Massachusetts under Section 1404 (a) of the Judicial Code, which
authorizes the transfer of a civil action to any district where it "might
have been brought," provided transfer is in the interest of justice and a
more convenient forum will result. The defendants probably thought
that after transfer, Massachusetts law, including the Massachusetts limita-
tion on damages in wrongful death actions, would be applicable.! Pennsyl-
vania had no such limitation. The Pennsylvania district court granted the
defendants' motion to transfer,4 although the plaintiffs had failed to
qualify to bring suit as personal representatives in Massachusetts. There-
after, the plaintiffs obtained a writ of mandamus from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to vacate the order.5 The Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari." Held: In situations governed by sec-
tion 1404(a), only federal venue and jurisdictional requirements need to
be considered in determining a defendant's unqualified right to transfer.
After transfer, the substantive law applicable in the original forum must
be applied in the transferee forum.7 Reversed and remanded. Van Dusen
v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to the enactment of section 1404(a), the Supreme Court, in
'28 U.S.C. 5§ 1391, 1332 (1965).
228 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1965), "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought."
a Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229 § 2 (1955) provided: "If the proprietor of a common carrier
of passengers . . . causes the death of a passenger, he . . . shall be liable in dollars in the sum
of not less than two thousand nor more than twenty thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference
to the degree of culpability of the defendant .. "4 Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
'Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1962).
'Van Dusen v. Barrack, 372 U.S. 964 (1963).
Plaintiffs had two main bases for their contention that transfer under section 1404(a) could
not be allowed. The plaintiffs' first contention was that the substantive law of the transferee state
would apply after transfer, and that the lack of capacity to sue under the law of the transferee
state would be "an absolute defense" to the action in the transferee district court. Thus transfer
would not have been in the "interest of justice." The plaintiffs also contended that Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), established the rule that transfer must be denied unless, at the time
the action was instituted, the plaintiffs had an unqualified right to bring that action in the trans-
feree forum. Therefore, transfer would be prohibited, because the plaintiffs did not have an un-
qualified right under Massachusetts law.
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Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,8 approved the use of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in federal courts when jurisdiction was based on diversity
of citizenship and venue was proper under general federal venue statutes.
Forum non conveniens provided for the dismissal of a plaintiff's action
which had been brought in an inconvenient forum. A defendant was pro-
tected from the unnecessary expense and trouble involved in a trial in an
inconvenient forum. In short, a plaintiff could not choose an inconvenient
forum in order to harass or oppress a defendant. However, unless the
balance of convenience shown and proved by the defendant was strongly
in favor of granting the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's choice of forum
would rarely be disturbed In applying forum non conveniens a court had
to dismiss the action if the defendant's motion was granted, because trans-
fer was not available. Following the Gulf Oil decision uncertainty existed
as to whether forum non conveniens could be invoked when venue was
fixed under special statutes." In addition, the defendant's burden of
proof would in many instances be too strict to sustain." Without the
benefit of a transfer provision, the dismissal power could work an undue
hardship on a plaintiff who had instituted suit in a proper, but inconven-
ient, forum."
In 1948 Congress enacted section 1404(a) to remedy the defects of
forum non conveniens. The avowed purpose of the section was to pro-
vide a statutory right to apply "forum non conveniens" in federal courts.
However, a most notable change from traditional forum non conveniens
was that the power of dismissal was replaced by the power of transfer.
In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, the Supreme Court defined
the policy of section 1404(a), saying: "The idea behind section 1404 (a)
is that where a civil action to vindicate a wrong-however brought in a
court-presents issues and requires witnesses that make one district court
more convenient than another, the trial judge can, after findings, transfer
the whole action to the more convenient court."" Thus, convenience of
all parties, not merely that of the defendant, is apparently the basic char-
acteristic of section 1404(a) according to the Court. If it is conceded
that the section is at least to some extent based on the forum non con-
8 330 U.S. 501 (1947). For a discussion of forum non conveniens see Blair, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1929).
'Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
"°In United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948), and Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941), it was decided that, in the particular situation, forum non con-
veniens could not be applied. In both cases, venue was fixed by special venue statutes. Section 12 of
the Clayton Act was applicable in National, and Section 6 of the Federal Employers Liability Act
was applicable in Kepner.
"' The defendant had the burden of presenting "strong" evidence supporting his contention that
the then present forum was very inconvenient for him.
" The plaintiff might discover that his claim had been barred by the statute of limitations in
the proper forum while he was erroneously pursuing it elsewhere.
"aContinental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960). One district judge has
stated that the purpose of section 1404(a) is "to afford relief to a defendant by placing him on
an equal footing with plaintiff in the selection of a forum in which to have his case tried." Trader v.
Pope & Talbot, Inc., 190 F.Supp. 282, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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veniens doctrine,' a fundamental conflict exists between section 1404 (a) as
construed in Continental Grain, and the traditional doctrine. As developed
in state courts, the doctrine was used to protect a defendant from trial
in an inconvenient forum, without consideration of the plaintiff's con-
venience.1 Today, section 1404 (a) may be used to secure a convenient
forum for either plaintiff or defendant.
Cases construing the statute between 1948 and the ruling in Hoffman
v. Blaski" may be divided into two categories. One group of decisions
held that section 1404 (a) was applicable to "all civil actions,"'" and a
second group held that the section was not a mere codification of the forum
non conveniens doctrine. Section 1404(a) was intended to be much
broader in scope than the doctrine, in that judges have greater discretion
in applying section 1404 (a) than existed under forum non conveniens."
Transfer is permissible although the extent of inconvenience shown would
not have justified a dismissal under forum non conveniens." Nevertheless,
many of the major factors considered in deciding whether to dismiss
under forum non conveniens are still to be considered in ordering transfer
under section 1404 (a)." In Hoffman, the defendant moved for transfer
to a district where venue did not lie and jurisdiction was lacking. The
Supreme Court interpreted the "might have been brought" clause of
section 1404 (a) to mean that a defendant may move for transfer only
to a district where venue would have been proper and jurisdictional re-
quirements could have been met at the time the action was originally
instituted. In addition, the Court ruled that a defendant may not trans-
form an improper district into one proper for transfer by waiving his
venue privilege and submitting to the jurisdiction of the "improper"
forum.21
Few cases have considered definitively the question of whether a change
of forum is to be accompanied by a change in applicable state substantive
law. A split of authority existed among the circuits on this issue. Two
well-known cases, H. L. Green Co. v. MacMahon" and Headrick v. Atchi-
son T. & S. F. Ry.," reached the conclusion that there should not be a
"4 Revision of Title 28 U.S.C., Report of the House Committee on Revision of the Laws on
H.R. 7124, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. A 127. Section 1404(a)"... was drafted in accordance with
the doctrine of forum non conveniens ... "
"' Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 1
(1929).
1'363 U.S. 335 (1960).
"See Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949); Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 337 U.S. 75
(1949); United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78 (1949). See generally 1 Moore,
Federal Practice 1760-66 (2d ed. 1961). The problem was whether section 1404(a) applied to civil
actions governed by special venue provisions, in addition to being applicable to civil actions
governed by the general federal venue provisions.
"8See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955); All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196
F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360 (4th
Cir. 1949).
" 1 Moore, Federal Practice 1787 (2d ed. 1961).
"Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, supra note 18. The factors are set out in the Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert decision and in Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
"1 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335.
2 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962).
"3182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950).
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change in applicable state substantive law, and that the case should remain
the same in all respects except location. Both decisions are also particularly
significant in that each ruled that the statute of limitations of the trans-
feror state is to apply after transfer, regardless of the fact that the statute
of limitations in the transferee state would bar a suit originally filed in
that state at the time of transfer.
II. VAN DuSEN v. BARRACK
The present case establishes that any qualification of section 1404(a),
and in particular the "might have been brought" clause, beyond the re-
strictions relating to venue and jurisdiction set forth in the Hoffman case,
is not to be allowed. The Court held that state law of the transferee forum
concerning a plaintiff's capacity to sue there, or for that matter, any law
of that state which might frustrate or prejudice plaintiffs in their actions,
is immaterial. Therefore, the plaintiffs' incapacity under Massachusetts
law to bring suit originally in Massachusetts is not a bar to transfer to a
federal district court in that state. Transfer to Massachusetts is permissible
because venue and jurisdiction are proper in that state.
The Supreme Court further held that a change of forum pursuant to
a section 1404 (a) transfer is not to be accompanied by a corresponding
change in applicable state substantive law. Thus, Pennsylvania law, in-
cluding the Pennsylvania choice of law rules, is applicable in the district
court in Massachusetts if a transfer occurs. The Court indicated that sec-
tion 1404 (a) is not intended to "narrow the plaintiff's venue privilege" or
deprive him of any state law advantage which might result from the exer-
cise of that privilege. Section 1404 (a) is intended simply to "counteract
the inconveniences that flowed from the venue statute by permitting trans-
fer to a convenient federal court.""' A defendant is not to receive a change,
of law as a bonus for a change of venue. This ruling not only has general
significance, but is especially important in determining whether to transfer
in the instant case. The transferor district court must look to the choice
of law rules of Pennsylvania in order to determine whether to apply the
Pennsylvania rule of damages or the Massachusetts rule. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has recently decided that the Pennsylvania rule of
damages is to apply in many instances in Pennsylvania courts, rather than
the damages rules of the lex loci delicti. 5 This Pennsylvania ruling could
greatly influence the considerations pertinent to a decision on the conven-
ience of parties and witnesses. The presence of material witnesses in Penn-
sylvania might preclude transfer to Massachusetts.
An apparent conflict exists between the Erie doctrine" and the decision
to apply the law and policy of the transferor state after transfer. Briefly
stated, the Erie doctrine is that a federal court sitting in a case in which
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship is to apply the statutory
and case law of the state in which it sits. However, the Court was able
24 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964).
2Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 3, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
"Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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to reconcile the conflict. Mr. Justice Goldberg reasoned that, although a
superficial reading of the Erie doctrine might suggest that the transferee
forum should apply the law of the state in which its sits, such an inter-
pretation contradicts the underlying policy of Erie. That policy is that
"for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant
in a federal court instead of in a state court a block away should not lead
to a substantially different result." 7 Federal diversity jurisdiction should
not enable a party to transfer a case and thereby avoid or change the result
which would have been achieved in the courts of the state of original
filing. The Court emphasized that the result in the federal court which
decides the case should be identical, so far as legal rules determine the
outcome of an action, with the result which would have been reached in
the courts of the state of original filing."
III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Justice Goldberg's interpretation of Hoffman is a liberal one in that
transfer will be promoted, because the state law of the transferee forum is
immaterial in determining whether the plaintiff has an unqualified right
to file suit originally in that state. However, the interpretation is restrictive
in that there may not always be an alternative forum which meets the
requirements of proper venue and jurisdiction. Actually, it appears that
an interpretation which does not declare the "might have been brought"
clause of section 1404 (a) to be meaningless is, of necessity, intrinsically
restrictive. For example, the districts to which transfer would be deemed
proper under a particular interpretation might all be inconvenient, or
there might not be a proper district for transfer at all. Perhaps the "broad
remedial purpose" of section 1404 (a) can become a reality only by elim-
inating the clause and thereby refusing to impose any restrictions on a
judge's exercise of his discretionary transfer power. 9
The possible consequences of the Court's interpretation seem for the
most part to be quite beneficial. It is now possible to avoid litigation
which in magnitude might approach a trial on the merits, because it is
no longer necessary to determine whether a plaintiff, under the law of the
transferee state, has an unqualified right to sue in the federal courts of
that state. This in turn obviates much of the difficulty in, and necessity
for, interpretation of foreign state law. Also, a plaintiff is not able to
restrict transfer by failing to qualify to sue in an otherwise proper forum
state.
The decision that a change of venue shall produce no change in appli-
27Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
2SVan Dusen v. Barrack, supra note 24, at 638-39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) provides: "Capacity
to Sue or Be Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity,
to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. . . . [A personal representa-
tive's] . . . capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the
district court is held .. " This rule ". . . must be interpreted similarly so that the capacity to
sue will also be governed by the laws of the transferor state." Van Dusen v. Barrack, supra note
24, at 642. Thus, Pennsylvania law governing capacity to sue is paramount. The fact that
Pennsylvania representatives failed to qualify to sue under Massachusetts law is immaterial.
'01 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 86.8 (Wright ed. 1960).
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cable law is in conflict with traditional forum non conveniens doctrine
as known in state and federal courts."0 Under section 1404 (a) the plaintiff,
rather than the defendant, is protected, assuming of course that the plain-
tiff chooses an original forum in which laws favorable to his position will
be applied.a' The plaintiff's advantage would not have accrued to him
had there been a dismissal under forum non conveniens. On the other
hand, a defendant must remain content under section 1404 (a), as was
formerly the case under forum non conveniens, to exercise his power to
"transfer" to a more convenient forum. No further or additional advan-
tage results to the defendant.
A major consequence arising from the decision to apply tranferor state
law is that the defendant cannot use section 1404 (a) as a forum-shopping
instrument, and will seek transfer for reasons of convenience instead of
possible advantage. Also, in deciding whether transfer is in the interest of
justice, there will be no time-consuming, pre-trial inquiries into the
validity of defenses the defendant might assert under the law of the
transferee state. The most significant consequence is that the astute plain-
tiff forum shopper will seldom be deprived of the advantage he seeks in
the law of the original forum, whereas the relationship between section
1404 (a) and forum non conveniens furnishes substantial support for the
view that one of the purposes of the section was to eliminate such ad-
vantages.32 The power to deprive the plaintiff of an "inequitable advan-
tage" should be recognized if section 1404 (a) is to perform the function
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as well as performing the func-
tion of a simple transfer provision." Professor Currie offers suggestions as
30 See Blair, supra note 15.
"
5The conflict of laws rules of the transferor forum also must be applied in the transferee
forum. The Court in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), held that in
cases in which jurisdiction depends upon diversity of citizenship, federal courts must also apply
the conflict of laws rules prevailing in the state in which they sit.
It may be thought undesirable to let the plaintiff reap a choice of law benefit from
the deliberate selection of an inconvenient forum. In a sense this is so, but the
alternatives seem even more undesirable. If the rules of the state where the trans-
feree district is located were to control, the judge exercising his discretion upon a
motion for transfer might well make a ruling decisive of the merits of the case.
Whether he should simply decide the appropriate place for trial, letting the choice of
law bonus fall as it may, or include in his consideration of the 'interest of justice'
the 'just' choice of law rule, the result is unfortunate. . . . A. L. I., Study of the
Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts § 1306, at 65-66 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1963).
3 Professor Currie, in The Erie Doctrine and Transfer of Civil Actions, 17 F.R.D. 353, 361
(1955), expresses the view that the forum shopper will never be deprived of his advantage. How-
ever, the doctrine of forum non conveniens still has a very limited vitality in federal courts. Dis-
missal is proper if a foreign forum is more convenient, because transfer is allowed only within the
federal judiciary. 1 Moore, Federal Practice 1788 (2d ed. 1961); 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 87 (Wright ed. 1960).
"Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 341,
348 (1960).
Although the issue was not decided, the Court in the Van Dusen case also seemed to intimate that,
should plaintiff, rather than defendant, move for transfer under section 1404(a), the transferee
forum would not be bound to apply the law of the transferor state.
The Court did not decide whether the law of the transferor state relating to forum non
conveniens was to be applied in federal courts in accordance with the Erie doctrine; if so, dis-
missal rather than transfer should be the result in certain instances, thus depriving the plaintiff
of any advantage gained in the original forum. If state forum non conveniens rules do not apply,
the result in a federal court could be quite different than the result which would have been reached
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to how such a power can be established. 4 Legislative amendment of
section 1404 (a) giving district courts the power of dismissal as an alterna-
tive to the power of transfer might be desirable. Criteria for determining
whether dismissal rather than transfer should be ordered will then have to
be established. Perhaps such criteria might be found by reference to state
law of forum non conveniens, and those criteria might be applied in
conformity with the Erie doctrine."a An alternative to, and perhaps a
better solution than, legislative amendment might be the invocation of
constitutional limitations. The limitations could be applied by way of the
due process, full faith and credit, privileges and immunities, or equal pro-
tection clauses of the federal constitution." For example, a transferee
federal court could refuse to apply the law of the transferor state in
situations in which that original forum state has no "interest" in the
application of its own law." But in cases of truly conflicting interests,
where both the transferor and transferee state have some degree of "inter-
est," a constitutional basis for decision by a court will seldom be possible.
Generally, in such cases transferor forum law will have to be applied in
the transferee forum regardless of any contrary public policy or law which
in the courts of the state of filing. The question could not be answered by saying that state forum
non conveniens rules are procedural, and therefore not applicable in federal courts. The Erie
doctrine ". . . puts aside abstractions regarding substance and procedure and concentrates on a
practical test: the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the
same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a state
court." Query, however, the extent of application and validity of the above rule today. See Smith,
Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 Tul, L. Rev.
443 (1962); Monarch Insurance Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960); Jaftex Corp. v.
Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d $08 (2d Cir. 1960). "Whether it is a procedural matter depends
upon whether the result is substantially affected, and that depends upon what law is applied after
transfer, and upon the state law of forum non conveniens." Currie, The Erie Doctrine and Transfer
of Civil Actions, 17 F.R.D. at 363.
'Currie, supra note 33.
asThe Supreme Court's opinion in Parsons v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 375 U.S. 71 (1963), has,
however, given rise to doubt whether this would be allowed. The Court stated that "a prior state
court dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens can never serve to divest a federal district
judge of the discretionary power vested in him by Congress to rule upon a motion to transfer under
section 1404(a)." This statement should not preclude the exercise of a power of dismissal by the
federal court applying state forum non conveniens theory, It should only preclude divestment of
the discretionary transfer power.
' Compare Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9 (1958), with Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 449 (1959). Professor Currie be-
lieves that the standard to be applied under both the due process and full faith and credit clauses
is only whether the forum had such an interest as would warrant the application of its laws. Pro-
fessor Weintraub agrees, but further believes that under the full faith and credit clause a further
limitation is to be imposed if the interests of the forum are outweighed by the national need for
full faith and credit to public acts, records, or judicial proceedings of a sister state. See Hill, Gov-
ernmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev.
463 (1960).
8 The definition of "interest" must be couched in terms of constitutional limitation. A clear-
cut case in which no "interest" existed is Headricl v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., supra note 23. Plain-
tiff was a resident of Missouri, the defendant was a Kansas corporation, and the injury occurred in
California. Suit was filed in New Mexico; that state had no apparent interest in, or connection
with, the suit other than being the site of the original forum. The California statute of limitations
had already barred the action in California. Nevertheless, plaintiff was allowed to invoke the as
yet unexpired New Mexico statute of limitations after transfer to California. This was a violation
of the due process and the full faith and credit clauses. See Watson v. Employees Liab. Assur.
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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may exist in the transferee state."a However, an exception to the general
rule might be found. The application of the choice of law rules of the
transferor forum state could be violative of the Constitution in a particular
case, if those rules refer to the law of a state which has no "interest" in
the application of its own law. It follows that the transferee forum should
not be bound to apply such rules.
The decision in Van Dusen v. Barrack is just the first incision in an
operation fraught with difficult and unforeseen problems. The constitu-
tional question of lack of "interest" assumes major proportions. It seems
quite possible that a plaintiff, rather than a defendant, will move to
transfer under section 1404(a), thereby posing questions heretofore not
considered. Van Dusen presents only a bare outline to guide the federal
courts in the future application of section 1404 (a).
James E. Barnett
" The Court mentioned the following New York cases: Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9
N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) and Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309
F.2d 553 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963), noted 29 J. Air L. & Corn. 69 (1963). See
Keeffe, Piercing Pearson, 29 J. Air L. & Com. 95 (1963). These cases are noted as departing from
the traditional choice of law rule in tort actions that the rights and liabilities arising from the tort
are determined by reference to the law of the place of the tort. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws
§ 397 (1934). In each case it was determined that the damages law of the forum state (New York)
would be applied rather than the damages limitation of the state where the wrong occurred. New
York policy against damages limitation was the basis for the rulings. New York acted solely as an
independent state in refusing to apply foreign state law in these cases, and therefore, such cases
must be distinguished from the situation in which the state would be involved merely because of
being the situs of the transferee federal court. In this latter capacity, the federal court of the
transferee district should not be able to invoke the policy of the state in which it sits in order to
prevent the application of transferor state law.
For a further discussion and analysis of the New York cases and subsequent developments, see:
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Griffith v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 3, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Comment, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 934 (1964); Currie,
Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Duke L.J. 1; Currie, The Constitution and the
Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9 (1958);
Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan. L.
Rev. 205 (1957).
